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ABSTRACT
This paper estimates social effects of incentivizing people in teams. In two field experiments featuring
exogenous team formation and opportunities for repeated social interactions, we find large team effects
that operate through social channels. The team compensation system induced agents to choose effort
as if they valued a marginal dollar of compensation for their teammate from two-thirds as much (in
one study) to twice as much as they valued a dollar of their own compensation (in the other study).
We conclude that social effects of monetary team incentives exist and can induce effort at lower cost
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1. Introduction 
 
  The interest in incentives to elicit effort or alter behavior is pervasive and growing. In the context 
of schooling, Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009), Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton (2009), Barrow et al. 
(2012), Bettinger (2010), and Fryer (2010) study how incentives affect students’ performance. Charness 
and Gneezy (2009), Volpp et al (2009), Ackland and Levy (2011), John et al (2011), Royer, Stehr, and 
Sydnor (2011), and Babcock and Hartman (2012), show that financial incentives can promote healthy 
behaviors such as exercise, weight loss, and smoking cessation. In many cases, the effectiveness of such 
incentives, however, has been questioned. In a review article, Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel (2011) argue 
that the experimental results for educational incentives have been “somewhat disappointing.”  Similarly, 
for healthy behaviors, incentives are often large (e.g., $750 for smoking cessation in Volpp et al (2009)) 
with limited improvements in behavior.  
  One common feature of these incentive programs is their use of individual-based incentives; that 
is, an individual’s payment is tied to his/her own behavior. But can we elicit more effort by changing the 
structure of these incentives? In particular, a vibrant but separate literature suggests that peers influence 
one another through social interactions or social pressure (Sacerdote, 2001, Zimmerman 2003, Bandiera, 
Barankay, and Rasul, 2005, 2010, forthcoming, Falk and Ichino 2005, Boisjoly et al, 2006, Foster 2006, 
Lyle, 2007, Kremer and Levy, 2008, Carrell, Fullerton, and West, 2009, Mas and Moretti, 2009, Carrell, 
Hoekstra, and West, 2011). Incentive structures, then, that take advantage of the full potential of these 
social influences may be quite effective. 
  Some believe that team compensation accomplishes this. One can imagine that peer influences 
are magnified when teammates’ incentives are linked. The popular press is full of accounts of harnessing 
the power of a team.
1 In real-world environments such as firms, the military, and health and wellness 
programs, it is not uncommon to see team-based incentives A best-selling management consultant goes so 
                                                 




compensation-system/.   2 
far as to argue that team incentives are more effective than any other policy, and that the effectiveness 
derives from social factors: “More than any policy or system, there is nothing like the fear of letting down 
respected teammates that motivates people to improve their performance.”
2   
  Despite  the  prevalence  of  this perception,  there is a  scarcity  of  empirical research  on  group 
incentive effects of this kind, research connecting the pay-for-behavior literature with the literature on 
peer effects. We study the effect of team-based incentives in two separate randomized field experiments, 
one featuring pay-for-studying, which incentivized attendance at a study hall in the library and the other 
featuring  pay-for-exercise,  which  incentivized  gym  attendance in  a  university  setting. These  are  two 
settings in which the power of peers has been emphasized,
3 each providing a controlled environment in 
which to learn about social effects related to effort elicitation. Given concerns about poor education 
outcomes and rising obesity, we consider both these outcomes, in and of themselves, to be of first-order 
importance. Evidence shows that study times among college students are declining steadily (Babcock and 
Marks, 2011) and rates of inactivity among adults are nearly fifty percent.
4 We focus on inputs (e.g., 
studying and exercising) rather than outputs (e.g., grades or weight loss), in line with the Fryer (2010) 
argument that incentivizing inputs is more effective than incentivizing outputs because individuals may 
be unclear about the production function. 
  Our study is a rare combination of the positive elements of laboratory experiments, where the 
environment can be carefully manipulated, and field experiments, which more closely resemble reality. In 
both settings, subjects were randomly assigned either to a) a control group, which received either no 
incentives or minimal incentives,
5 b) an individual-incentive group, which earned incentives based on 
their  own  behavior,  or  c)  a  team-incentive  group,  which  was  subject  to  the  same-sized  monetary 
                                                 
2 Lencioni (2002), p. 213 
3 The new Go4Life campaign funded by the National Institute on Aging (http://go4life.niapublications.org/) to 
encourage physical activity for older Americans allows participants to sign up with a buddy to increase motivation. 
The website (http://www.exercisefriends.com/home.aspx) allows individuals to find others with whom to exercise. 
4 See http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus10.pdf#070. 
5 In the case of studying, we incentivized attendance to a study hall in the library. Since we would not be able to 
monitor the attendance of students who did not receive incentives, our control group for the study experiment 
received a small monetary incentive for attendance.   3 
incentives as the individual incentive group but whose payment was partially contingent on the behaviors 
of  a  randomly-assigned  and  known  teammate.  In  the  pay-for-studying  experiment,  we  also  had  an 
additional treatment, the anonymous treatment, which was identical to c), except that the teammate was 
unknown. Within the incentive groups, all individuals received small per-visit incentives with a much 
larger bonus payment contingent on attending at least a specified number of times. To create the team 
incentive, the awarding of the bonus was dependent on both the individual and his/her partner attaining 
the threshold number of visits in the case of the team treatments.  
  The goal of our experimental design is to tease out the social effects of incentives. To be clear, we 
define such effects as those that are related in a direct way to the utility an individual derives from 
interacting with others, including but not limited to effects from altruism, guilt, shame, embarrassment, 
commitment devices, fear of social punishment, or a desire to be liked or respected. Thus, these effects 
exclude specialization in production or knowledge transfers, even though these, too, could be viewed as 
types of peer effects. It has been theorized that social pressures are an important factor in the design of 
incentives to elicit effort. Kandel and Lazear (1992) argue that many practices at firms have more to do 
with  creating  social  pressure  in  the  form  of  “empathy,  loyalty,  and  guilt”  than  with  improving  the 
production process in a direct way. It is effects of this kind, rarely analyzed explicitly in environments 
with team-based compensation, that are of interest in this paper.
6  
There are several key features of the experimental design that enable us to uniquely isolate the 
social  effects.  First,  the  tasks  involve  minimal  production  complementarities.  In  most  research,  the 
possibility of production complementarities is significant. For example, Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan 
(2003), find that worker productivity rose at a garment plant with the introduction of team incentives. But 
it is not clear whether these gains were due to increased effort that resulted from social pressure or from 
complementarities in production among workers that involved specialization, knowledge transfer, and 
                                                 
6 Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (forthcoming), a notable exception, study performance under different team 
compensation schemes (rank and tournament incentives) allowing for endogenous team formation. Though they are 
able to study endogenous team formation, involving friendships and other social factors, they are not able to 
compare individual-based incentive schemes to those that are team-based, and so do not estimate social effects.   4 
other factors directly related to the production process. Second, the team incentive structure is such that a 
subject cannot rely exclusively on his/her partner’s effort to earn rewards: If anyone defaults, no one 
earns the bonus.
7  While this may seem less generalizable to real-world settings that feature payment for 
group performance, we do observe this kind of incentive structure outside of academic settings. In the 
military, for example, it is common in boot camp for individuals to be incentivized in much the same 
manner as in our experiment: When one fails, all members of the team are punished.
8 Moreover, since the 
goal of our experiment is to understand the social effects of incentives, closing off the channel for this 
type of free-riding is desirable. Third, since subjects in the team treatment belong to the same class in the 
middle of the term, the setting facilitates social interaction between teammates over an extended period of 
time—hard to accomplish in the laboratory, where one-time sessions predominate.  
These features of the experiment imply that if there is no social component to utility and there is 
some nonzero probability of default by one’s partner, then attendance will be higher for those in the 
individual treatment than for those in the team treatment. But if the reverse is true, we interpret this as 
evidence of the existence of social effects. Using a structural model, we can leverage differences across 
the different treatments to estimate the size of the social effect.  
  To our surprise, we find in the pay-for-study intervention that individuals assigned to the team 
treatment frequented the study room roughly twice as often as individuals assigned to the individual 
treatment. Individuals assigned to the anonymous team treatment performed only about as well as the 
individual treatment, suggesting that the knowledge of your partner has important effects. We estimate 
similar but slightly more nuanced effects for the gym study. Our findings are all the more unanticipated 
given the claim of earlier literature that production complementarities are absolutely necessary for team 
incentives to be effective, and that arbitrarily assigned or “artificial” teams do not produce positive results 
(Lazear  2000).  Results  from  our  structural  model  suggest  that  the  pay-for-study  experiment  induced 
                                                 
7 This nonlinear incentive structure is similar in spirit to Holmstrom’s (1982) “forcing contracts” except that effort 
here is observable.  
8 Kandel and Lazear (1992) argue that “Guilt, in the form of loyalty to… comrades, provides incentives that operate 
even in the absence of observability. Thus the military spends much time and money creating loyalty and team 
spirit” (p.807).    5 
agents to choose their effort as if they valued a marginal dollar of compensation for their teammate more 
than twice as much as they valued a dollar of their own compensation, while in the pay-for-exercise 
experiment, agents chose effort as if they valued a marginal dollar for their teammate two thirds as much 
as a dollar of their own compensation.  
  We  highlight  two  central  implications  of  these  findings.  Firstly,  social  effects  of  team 
compensation can be decisive in inducing agents to accomplish effort-intensive tasks. Secondly, team 
compensation schemes can be designed that elicit effort at much lower cost per unit than direct individual 
payment, even in the absence of production complementarities. As in any field experiment, it is not clear 
how well the findings generalize beyond the two environments studied. However, the findings here—
robust  across  two  settings  and  based  on  tasks  that  institutions  and  policymakers  have  attempted  to 
incentivize in the past—raise the intriguing possibility that there may be large returns to harnessing the 
power of the group.  
  We view our study as a first step to developing programs to address the lingering issues of 
obesity and poor academic success. Our intervention was likely too short to observe effects on these 
outcomes. But since the outcomes we study here, studying and exercise, are related to the downstream 
outcomes of obesity and academic success, we might expect that more intensive team-based interventions 
inspired by those here, would be particularly effective.  
 
2. Conceptual Framework  
  To  fix  ideas,  it  is  worth  developing  a  simple  framework  to  track  benefits  and  costs  for  the 
incentive schemes in our experiment. Consider a program analogous to our own in which individuals 
receive a bonus pay-off for completing an effort-intensive task. We imagine two incentive schemes. In the 
individual treatment, person i gains utility Ui = Vi + B - Ci from completing the task, where V is the 
intrinsic value i has for completing the task, B is the utility derived from the bonus earned for completing 
the task, and C is the effort cost of completing the task. If person i does not complete the task, he earns 
zero. In the second treatment, there is an additional condition: The individual is assigned a teammate j and   6 
receives the bonus only if his teammate also completes the task. We define pj as the probability that 
person i assigns to his/her partner (person j) completing the task
9 and θ as the magnitude of the social 
effect. This is the degree to which enabling person j to earn the bonus enters person i’s utility function. 
We emphasize that this is not, strictly speaking, an altruism parameter, though it could be due in part to 
altruism and enters the utility function in the way traditionally used to capture altruism. (It could capture 
guilt, embarrassment, fear of social punishment, commitment and other subtle social responses that will 
be  discussed  in  Section  5).  Lastly,  imagine  there  is  also  a  control  group  that  receives  no  external 
compensation for completing the task and whose utility for completion, Ui = Vi - Ci, is based entirely on 
the intrinsic benefit and cost. The conditions under which various subjects complete the task are then: 
 
(1a)   Control Group:      Undertake the action if:       
(1b)   Individual Treatment:     Undertake the action if    
 
(1c)   Team Treatment:     Undertake the action if:   
 
We note first that the incentive structure in the team treatment does not allow for subjects to earn 
the bonus by depending solely on partner effort. If person i does not put forth effort, neither she nor her 
partner receives payment. Secondly, in both experiments, the task in question did not allow in any direct 
way for knowledge transfers. (All subjects were told where the library was or where the gym was—
which, of  course,  nearly  everyone  already  knew.) We  will  also  show  that  there  is little evidence  of 
subjects harnessing any other possible production complementarities related to teamwork (e.g., studying 
more effectively by studying together, exercising more effectively by going to the gym together): Pairs of 
teammates in the team treatment made simultaneous library (or gym) visits only slightly more often than 
randomly paired subjects.
10  
                                                 
9 We all assume all individuals receive the same benefit. 
10This also suggests that teamed subjects do not go to the library or gym together as a commitment mechanism to 
help them overcome time-inconsistency in their preferences. See the discussion in section 5.   7 
Thirdly, we model the decision to undertake the action in the team treatment for person i to be 
independent of the cost of effort for person j, their partner, and we also consider that pj is exogenous to 
person i. Person i takes j’s effort level as given, ex ante. The decision to abstract from strategic behavior 
is motivated by the fact that it would be difficult or nearly impossible to model such interactions without 
information about beliefs. But simply gathering information about beliefs could change the nature of the 
intervention, so we avoided collecting such information. Inquiring about a subject’s beliefs about his 
partner may lead the subject to change beliefs about the partner’s future actions. Fourthly, we do not 
allow for strategic behavior in form of  side payments between teammates. We monitored teammates 
closely when the assignment of teammates occurred and subsequently when payments were delivered. We 
observed no evidence of threats or negotiation of side payments. In fact, at the time of payment, most 
teammates seemed unaware of their partner’s attendance. 
Overall, if there is no social component to utility (  = 0) and the probability of partner default is 
greater than 0, then individuals are more likely to undertake the action under the individual treatment than 
under the team treatment. If incentives work as or more effectively for the team treatment than for the 
individual treatment, we will interpret this as evidence that social effects exist and are large enough to 
compensate  for  lowered  expectations  of  monetary  gain.  Leveraging  the  three  treatments  in  the 
experimental design will also allow us to estimate  , and quantify the magnitude of the social effect 
relative  to  the  direct  pecuniary  effect.  At  the  end  of  the  paper,  we  will  consider  several  different 
behavioral mechanisms and speculate about which are most consistent with our findings.  
 
3. Experimental Design and Sampling  
A. Experimental Design, Pay for Studying 
In  the  pay  for  studying  part  of  the  experiment,  subjects  were  recruited  in  several  classes  at 
University of California-Santa Barbara. We summarize the experiment design here and relegate further 
details to the appendix. At the beginning of class, we had students fill out a short survey. Most students 
present in class filled out this survey. Each survey had a unique identifier that determined the treatment   8 
arm but which students were unable to decipher. In fact most students were not cognizant of the presence 
of the identifier.
11 At the end of class, students were notified of their treatments. To induce students to 
show up at the end of class, we told them of their opportunity to earn additional money and of their 
eligibility to earn a $50 raffle. Participant rates were high (over 70 percent).
 12 Participant rates did not 
differ across treatment status; p-values of differences always exceed 0.25. For descriptive ease, we refer 
to  the  students  who  decide  to  participate  in  the  after-class  part  of  the  experiment  as  participants 
throughout the paper. 
Unlike many settings, here we are able to understand the degree of selectiveness of our sample 
because of the setup of the experiment. In the first stage of the experiment, we gathered the distribution of 
characteristics of the intended target population (i.e., students in the class
13), and thus, we can see how the 
intended target population differs from the students who partake in the experiment.   
Participants were incentivized to attend the 24-hour study room in the UCSB library over a two-
week  period  at  the  beginning  of  the  quarter. We required  students  to attend at  least  40  consecutive 
minutes between the hours of 11am and 7pm on Monday-Friday. Visits at the study room were supervised 
by a member of the research team; the research team did not divulge the attendance record of others when 
subjects inquired. Further details on data collection are discussed in the appendix. Subjects could receive 
credit for no more one visit in a day. The treatment groups and control group were as follows: 
 
Control: Subjects were eligible to earn $2 per visit (up to 4 visits). 
 
Individual Treatment: Subjects were eligible to earn $2 per visit (up to 4 visits), but also received an 
additional bonus of $25 for attendance equal to or exceeding 4 visits ($33 in total possible earnings).  
 
                                                 
11 We varied the scheme mapping the identifier to treatment assignment across classes as described in the appendix. 
12 Participation rates for the control, individual, team, and anonymous treatments were 67, 74, 74 and 69 percent, 
respectively. 
13 Of course, we will miss collecting data for those who do not attend class. But any classroom-based program is 
likely to miss those persons too.     9 
Team Treatment: Subjects were eligible to earn $2 per visit (up to 4 visits), but also received an additional 
bonus of $25 if and only if both team members accumulated four or more eligible visits. Team members 
were randomly assigned according to the procedure described in the appendix. Team members were not 
required to attend the study hall at the same time. As it was important that team members had a chance to 
meet and talk, we had teammates stand next to each other during the sign-up process and exchange names 
by filling out their partner’s name and email on a sheet of paper.  
 
Anonymous Team Treatment: Subjects were eligible to earn $2 per visit (up to 4 visits), but also received 
an additional bonus of $25 if and only if both team members accumulated four or more eligible visits. 
Different from the team treatment, the teammate was randomly assigned but unknown (i.e., a member of a 
different class).  
 
Several aspects of the experimental design warrant comment. First, the “control” subjects were 
paid a minimal incentive of $2 per visit. This was done because absent our experiment, study room usage 
is not recorded. In all treatments, students can earn $2 per visit. Thus, the experiment offers variation in 
bonus size ($0 vs $25) and the method of earning the bonus (either dependent on one’s own behavior or 
the combined behavior of oneself and a randomly-assigned partner). Second, to encourage studying we 
emphasized that it was a study hall and monitored subjects. Students appeared to be studying rather than 
socializing.  Third, since  subjects in  the  team  treatment  are in  the  same  class  and  we  conducted  the 
experiment at the beginning of the quarter, the experiment was designed to allow for repeated interaction. 
To ensure treatment salience, subjects were reminded of their treatment at the end of the recruitment 
week. In addition, subjects were informed that payments would be made with several weeks left in the 
quarter. Thus, there was ample time for social interaction after team members received information (i.e., 
payment) that potentially revealed whether they had “let down the team.” 
   10 
B. Experimental Design, Pay for Exercise 
  For  pay-for-exercise  part  of  the  experiment,  subjects  were  recruited  at  several  classes  at 
University of California-Santa Barbara during a summer session in 2010. The sign-up process was similar 
to that for the library experiment except that there was no anonymous team treatment. All details are the 
same as in the library experiment, except as stated below.  
  In this part of the experiment, subjects were incentivized to attend the UCSB Recreation Center 
(“Rec Center”) at the beginning of the summer session during a two-week period. The Rec Center is the 
on-campus student gym, which is free for registered students. The Rec Center collects electronic data of 
ID card swipes. Note, unlike in the studying experiment, we do not require that students spend a specified 
amount of time at the Rec Center, but it should be noted that the Rec Center is located sufficiently far 
away from the academic buildings that Rec Center attendance incurs substantial time cost. 
  As in the studying experiment, all subjects were eligible for the $50 raffle. Additionally, subjects 
were randomly assigned to one of the following groups: 
 
Control: Subjects were not eligible for extra payment. 
 
Individual Treatment: Subjects were eligible to earn $2 per visit (up to 5 visits), but also received an 
additional bonus of $25 for attendance equal to and exceeding 5 visits ($35 in total possible earnings).  
 
Team Treatment: Subjects were eligible to earn $2 per visit (up to 5 visits), but also received an additional 
bonus of $25 if and only if both team members accumulated five or more eligible visits.  
 
  Unlike in the pay-for-study experiment, control subjects were not paid for visits. This is because 
the Rec Center, unlike the library, requires subjects to sign-in and records the information. Just as in the 
study experiment, there was no significant difference in participation rates between treatment groups. 
Participation  rates  for  the  control,  individual,  and  team  treatments  were  79,  75,  and  76  percent, 
respectively.   11 
D. Survey Response and Experiment Participants 
Table 1 reports the distribution of enrollment sizes, the number of in-class surveys collected, and 
the number of experiment participants (students who came outside after class and were assigned to a 
treatment  or  control  group)  for  the  library  experiment.  In  terms  of  participation  in  the  experiment, 
conditional on completing a survey, 71 percent of survey participants stayed after class for the lottery and 
were assigned to a treatment or control group. This attrition rate is not large when gauged against other 
field experiments (e.g., Card, Mas, Moretti, and Saez, 2010). The difference between enrollment size and 
survey response reflects almost entirely differences in class attendance, late arrival, and subjects enrolled 
in multiple classes used in this study. While exact class attendance is unknown on the day of recruitment, 
the vast majority of students present in class completed the survey.
14 The last row of Table 1 reports the 
survey and participant sample sizes used in all analyses.
15  
Table 2 shows the analogous table for the Rec Center experiment. Again, participation in the 
experiment given completion of the in-class survey is high at 76 percent. Overall participation rates (the 
fraction  of  the  enrolled  students  partaking  in  our  study)  is  higher  here  likely  for  two  reasons:  the 
recruitment was done earlier in the term and there are fewer students taking multiple classes in our 
experimental pool. Only a few observations are excluded from the final analysis sample.
16  
 
4. Empirical Results – Pay for Studying 
  We divide the discussion of the empirical results in two sections. We first describe the results for 
the pay-for-studying experiment and then finish with the results for the pay-for-exercise experiment. 
                                                 
14 Students were told not to sign-up more than once. Since some students enroll in multiple Economics classes 
simultaneously  each  quarter,  this  lowered  the  participation  rate  in  some  classes.  For  example,  the  last  four 
Economics classes (122, 118, 106, and 114) we signed up each had lower-than-average participation rates. 
15 The small number of sample exclusions stem from three possible reasons: ten subjects filled out surveys in two 
different classes, four people who came to the after-class treatment assignment left after being assigned a partner but 
before signing the informational treatment sheet given to subjects, and one subjects is excluded from the anonymous 
treatment because we had an odd number of people assigned to that treatment. 
16 About three percent of subjects were excluded due to leaving after being assigned treatment, signing up multiple 
times, giving a fake name, or having a partner excluded for one of the reasons just mentioned. The partner exclusion 
includes one subject that was excluded for being matched with a person who had previously been matched with a 
partner who left after being treated for assignment.   12 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 3 shows sample means of descriptive characteristics (gender, age, and pre-
treatment library usage) by treatment status for all subjects who completed the in-class survey in the pay-
for-studying experiment.
 For this sample, there were no statistically significant differences across groups 
in  these  characteristics  as  seen  in  the  p-values  for  mean  differences.  Panel  B  reports  the  same 
comparisons for participants (i.e., those who showed up after class) and non-participants (i.e., those who 
did not show up after class). The only statistically significant difference is in age: Older students were 
somewhat less likely to participate. Inferences will be based on the sample of participants. We draw no 
conclusions about the 28 percent of in class-responders who were non-participants and who appear to 
have been somewhat older, on average. Panel C shows sample means of descriptive characteristics by 
treatment status for the 491 subjects who participated in the experiment. Age, gender, and pre-treatment 
library  usage  do  not  differ  significantly  between  group  treatment,  individual  treatment,  anonymous 
treatment, and control groups, as indicated by the p-values at the bottom of the table.  
 
B. Results  
  We examine three attendance outcomes: 1) the number of study room visits during the treatment 
period; 2) whether the subject went at least once to the study room during the treatment period; 3) 
whether the subject used the study room on four different days during the treatment period (which is the 
threshold for receiving the $25 bonus). These outcomes are designated “Visits,” “Try,” and “Bonus,” 
respectively.  Table  4  displays  means  of  these  outcomes  for  the  different  treatment  groups.  Control 
subjects in the sample visited the study room 1.3 times on average during the treatment period. 40 percent 
of the control subjects showed up to the study room at least once, and 19 percent reached the 4-visit bonus 
threshold. The individual treatment estimates in Table 4 show that subjects responded strongly to the 
direct individual pecuniary incentive. Specifically, subjects in the individual treatment made about 0.9 
more visits to the study room during the treatment period than did controls, were 17 percentage points 
more  likely  to  have  gone  to  the  study  room  at  least  once,  and  were  more  than  twice  as  likely  (21   13 
percentage  points)  to  have  met  the 4-visit  bonus  payment  threshold,  with  all differences  statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level as indicated by the p-values at the bottom of the table. It is clear that 
subjects eligible for a bonus for study room visits visited more often.   
The  more  striking  finding  is  for  the  difference  between  individual  and  team  treatments. 
Participants randomized into the team-incentive scheme made about 0.6 more visits to the study room 
during the treatment period, were 13 percentage points more likely to have gone to the study room at least 
once, and were 17 percentage points more likely to have met the 4-visit threshold than those in the 
individual treatment, with all differences being statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The team 
incentive elicited higher effort on all margins.  
Interestingly, subjects paired with an anonymous partner put forth more effort than controls (1.8 
visits versus 1.3 for the controls), but the anonymous treatment was somewhat less effective than the 
individual treatment (2.2 visits), and much less effective than the team treatment in which subjects met 
their partners (2.8 visits). Thus, knowing the identity of one’s partner (and knowing that said partner also 
knew one’s identity, etc.) would appear to be a crucial factor influencing the magnitude of the social 
effect.  
In is also interesting to see the distribution of effects. Figure 1 shows the distribution of Study 
Room visits during the treatment period, by treatment group. We emphasize the stark rightward shift of 
the  distribution  for  team  treatment  relative  to  individual  treatment.  In  short,  both  incentive  schemes 
produced an effect, but the team treatment was more effective. This was in spite of the fact that the risk of 
a partner’s default in the team treatment was 43 percent. It is clear, then, even at first glance, that large, 
team-related social effects are implied, because the rate of bonus-earning in the team treatment is more 
than 40 percent higher than in the individual treatment, despite the fact that both teammates had to satisfy 
the requirement. 
In order to check the robustness of the findings to the inclusion of covariates, we formalize the 
group mean comparisons using the following simple regression specification:    14 
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where  Yi  is  an  attendance  outcome  for  individual  i,  T
Any
  is  an  indicator  variable  for  having  been 
randomized into either the individual or the team treatment, T
Team is an indicator variable for being in the 
team treatment, T
Anon is an indicator variable for being in the anonymous treatment, and ε is the usual 
error term. The coefficient of primary interest is β2, as this captures the difference between team treatment 
and individual treatment effects. In the absence of social effects, we would expect β2 to be negative (i.e., 
the team treatment to do worse).  
Table  5,  column  1  displays  results  of  OLS  regressions  for  the  continuous  outcome  variable 
“Visits” on treatment status; columns 2 and 3 report results of analogous linear probability regressions for 
the dichotomous outcome variables “Try” and “Bonus.”
17 These columns duplicate results from Table 4 
in a regression setting, using equation 2). To test the robustness of our results, we add varying controls to 
these basic regressions. The inclusion of such controls should not affect our treatment effect estimates 
much because of the randomness of our treatments, but regardless, some may worry that our recruitment 
process induced some selection. Columns 4-6 of Table 5 show results of regression models that include 
age, gender, and pre-treatment library usage as covariates. Columns 7-9 add class fixed effects. Under all 
specifications, the same pattern emerges and the differences in bonus-earning between treatments are 
similar.  
In  addition  to  the  relative  magnitudes  of the  effects  of  the  different treatments,  we  are  also 
interested in relative costs of the different treatments. Not only is the team treatment more effective, it 
costs less because it includes subjects who put forth effort to meet the threshold but did not get paid the 
bonus (due to a teammate defaulting). The average per visit cost in the team treatment was $5.00, whereas 
the average cost for the same outcome in the individual treatment was $6.30. Thus the per-visit cost of the 
individual treatment is 26 percent higher than for the team treatment. 
                                                 
17 Standard errors are clustered at the group level. Thus, group sizes are two for those assigned to the team and 
anonymous treatments and one for those assigned to the control and individual treatment. All conclusions for this 
table and all subsequent tables are similar if probit models are used instead of linear probability models.    15 
In the next subsection we use the model of Section 2 to separate out pecuniary and social effects, 
and to estimate their relative magnitudes.  
 
C. The Social Effect 
How large is the social effect implied by these results?  We revisit the model of Section 2 to 
answer this question. The decision to complete the task and earn a $25 bonus for person i is given by 
equations (1a), (1b) and (1c), if she is assigned to the control, individual, or team treatments, respectively. 
For  the  moment,  we  restrict  the  analysis  to  these  treatments,  and  do  not  consider  the  anonymous 
treatment. 
We estimate the components of utility described in Section 2, allowing individuals to vary in their 
tastes  and  predicted  behavior  based  on  observable  characteristics.  First,  we  model  the  utility  that 
individual i derives from his/her partner completing the task. Second, we use the generated probability of 
individual i’s partner completing the task based on the first step as an input in the utility model for 
individual i (along with the treatment status and individual characteristics). More formally, this non-linear 
model featuring a set of probit regressions is as follows:  
(3)   
(4)   
where   is the utility for individual i associated with completing the task,  is 1 if i completes the task 
and zero otherwise,  is 1 if i’s partner completes the task and zero otherwise (note that it is zero by 
definition when no partner is present),  and   are background characteristics of person  i and his 
partner,  respectively,    is  an  indicator  variable  identifying  assignment  to  the  individual  treatment 
group, , predicted from the probit in equation (3), indicates i’s belief about the probability that his/her 
partner will complete the task (and is zero if i is not in the team treatment), and   and   are the usual 
probit error terms. Here, equation (3) is only relevant for the subjects with partners (i.e., the team sample).   16 
For everyone else,   (thus,  . We start with this approach and later consider deviations 
from this approach in which we vary the way in which   is derived. 
There  are  three  identifying  assumptions  implicit  in  this  approach.  The  first  is  that  the  non-
monetary utility (net of cost) associated with going to the study hall is independent of the availability of 
the  monetary  incentive.  The  second  simplifying  assumption  is  that  beliefs  about  partner  study  hall 
attendance are based on partner’s initial observables (which we gather from our recruitment survey done 
at the beginning of class), and that subjects do not take into consideration their partner’s reactions to their 
own  initial  observables  when  predicting  their  partner’s  behavior  (i.e.,  the  lack  of  strategic  behavior 
discussed earlier). The third is that predictions of the partners’ probability of completing the task are 
correct  on  average,  since  the  estimate  is  based  on  observed  data.  Under  these  assumptions,  we  can 
estimate the probability of going to the study hall at least four times for all  individuals in the three 
treatments in a single equation that includes a generated regressor (i.e., the probability of the partner 
completing the task).  
  This  estimation  strategy  leverages  the  experimental  design  in  several  ways  to  identify  the 
components of utility (compare equation (4) with 1a-c): 1) Observed characteristics (age, gender, and pre-
treatment library usage) identify intrinsic benefits and costs associated with study hall visits without 
compensation  ( );  2)  The  difference  between  observationally  similar  subjects  in 
control and individual treatments identifies utility gains associated with own pecuniary benefits ( ); 
3) a comparison of observationally similar subjects in individual and team treatments identifies social 
effects related to partners’ pay-off ( ). 
    We bootstrap to account for the presence of the generated regressor. Table 6 displays the results. 
The estimates imply that subjects received a utility gain of 0.54 utils from their own pecuniary benefit of 
being paid $25 (i.e., the estimate in the individual treatment indicator row), and received a utility gain of 
1.64 utils from pecuniary and social benefits together (i.e., the estimate from the predicted partner bonus 
status row). Bootstrapped confidence intervals indicate that both estimates are distinguishable from zero   17 
at the 5 percent level. Thus, our estimate of the social parameter  , is 2.03, and is also statistically 
distinguishable from zero at the 5 percent level. Recall that this social parameter identifies the weight one 
puts on one’s partner’s utility in determining one’s own utility. Thus, the implied social impact of team 
compensation is very large – more than twice as large as the effect of own pecuniary compensation. 
Importantly, we emphasize that one cannot infer from the findings that agents care more about others than 
about themselves. We have captured a broad social effect, rather than simple altruism, and will attempt to 
interpret it more carefully in the next subsection.  
The coefficient of 2.030 in Table 6, derived from a model in which agents use information to 
predict teammates’ choices, is our preferred estimate of   However, it could be argued that subjects have 
difficulty estimating their partners’ probability of meeting the payment threshold, given observables. One 
might question whether previous library usage is observable.
18 To explore robustness, then, it is worth 
estimating the social parameter given different beliefs about the probability of partner default.  
Panel B of Table 6 displays the estimate of  , given several different focal beliefs about teammate 
performance. If subjects believe their teammates will meet the bonus payment threshold with certainty, 
then they are more willing to meet the threshold, themselves, for their own pecuniary benefit. We do not 
think it is realistic that subjects would be so optimistic, but have reported this result because it gives us a 
lower bound on   Belief with certainty that teammates will earn the bonus yields a lower bound on 
possible values of   because it implies that agents think they will receive the maximum possible monetary 
gain (and leaves less utility gain to be explained by social factors.) As shown in Row 1 of Panel B, even if 
agents believe their partners will never default, the implied social parameter is large: Agents act as though 
they value a marginal dollar of compensation for their teammate 64 percent as much as they value a 
marginal dollar of compensation for themselves.  
                                                 
18 One might also be concerned that subjects consider how their partners will react to their own observables when 
they form their estimates of their partners’ probability of completing the task. The simultaneous two-person game 
that could be used to represent the team treatment is a simple coordination game with two pure-strategy Nash 
equilibria and a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. We do not argue that agents find their way to the mixed-strategy 
Nash equilibrium in this one-shot game (which depends on the form of their utility functions) but map out scenarios 
consistent with a range of beliefs.    18 
In Row 2, we consider what happens under the scenario where subjects are correct on average but 
lack the ability to make finer distinctions between individuals, based on observables. The estimated   is 
1.88, close to our preferred estimate in Panel A. On the other hand, if subjects are very pessimistic about 
teammate performance, the implied social effect is even larger. Row 2 of Table 6, Panel B, shows results 
if subjects believe their partners will not respond at all to the $25 bonus incentive, and will instead behave 
exactly  as  the  controls  do.  In  this  somewhat  unrealistic  case,  pessimism  about  own  pecuniary 
compensation  would  imply  that  the  only  way  to  explain  higher  observed  effort  choices  in  the  team 
treatment would be with an extremely large social parameter:   =7.79. 
We can also consider the implied social effect under the anonymous treatment. The structural 
model of equations (3) and (4) is inappropriate for the anonymous treatment because a subject cannot 
observe the characteristics of his/her teammate and use them to predict default probability. But it is 
possible in the anonymous treatment for subjects to form estimates of teammate default probability based 
on  group  means  or  other  possible  focal  beliefs.  Column  2  shows  estimates  of    in  the  anonymous 
treatment for the three beliefs described above. If subjects believe their anonymous partners will never 
default, the estimated   is negative but not significantly different from zero. If subjects are correct, on 
average, about teammate performance, then the implied social factor is 0.86, but imprecisely estimated, 
and if subjects believe their anonymous teammates will not respond to the prospect of earning a bonus, 
the implied   is 2.28. Not surprising, the social effect, then, is stronger when subjects have met their 
partners than when they are paired with an anonymous stranger. This could be because knowing and 
being known by one’s teammate creates the opportunity for social punishment that is not present in the 
anonymous case. It could also be that subjects value the pay-offs of people they have met more than they 
value the pay-offs of anonymous strangers.  
   19 
D. Mechanisms 
The parameter   is intended to capture incentive effects due to social factors. It is an umbrella 
term covering a number of potential mechanisms. We will focus on three broad classes of mechanisms 
that have been posited in previous research.  
 
1) Altruism, guilt, shame, fear of social punishment. There are a number of different forms of social 
motivations that could come into play in our environment. One such motivation is altruism, in which the 
payoff of another person (or persons) enters into one’s own utility function regardless of circumstances, 
beliefs, actions, etc. But it bears emphasizing that social motivations come in many flavors besides this, 
and that θ in our framework could capture any of these.
19  For example, guilt aversion involves an 
individual  feeling  guilty  about  disappointing  the  expectations  of  people  who  act  favorably  on  one’s 
behalf; the more one believes that the other people expect one to perform an act, the more guilty one 
would  feel from  non-performance.  Shame  involves  negative  feelings  about  one’s  observed  behavior, 
regardless of the expectations of others. It is also possible that subjects feel neither altruism, nor guilt, nor 
shame, but simply wish to avoid reprisal and social punishment from peers they disappoint.  
 
2) Production Complementarities. Production complementarities have been the dominant justification 
for the construction of teams in the workplace. Lazear (2000) asserts that production complementarities 
are absolutely necessary for team incentives to be effective, and that teams should not be used when these 
are not present. Production complementarities could explain the large estimate of   if subjects put forth 
more effort in the team treatment because studying is more valuable or productive (or even more fun) 
when done jointly. 
 
                                                 
19 Recent papers investigating forms of social preferences include Loewenstein, Bazerman, and Thompson (1989), 
Bolton (1991), Fehr and Schmidt  (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels  (2000), and Charness and Rabin (2002). Guilt 
aversion is considered in Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), and Battigalli and 
Dufwenberg (2007, 2009). See Charness and Kuhn (2011) for a survey of the literature on these social motivations.    20 
3) Self-control and pre-commitment. In models of self-control and pre-commitment, individuals fail to 
meet goals because the present self lacks the ability to bind itself to a plan of action that would benefit the 
future self; the present self would instead rather engage in a more-immediately-pleasurable activity.
20  
Having a partner could remedy this problem, even if the individual does not value the teammate’s payoff. 
If one commits oneself to study with a partner, it is more difficult to back out. In short, individuals who 
have been jointly incentivized may use each other to devise commitment mechanisms. 
  
  We  now  briefly  offer  some  evidence  to  distinguish  among  these  channels.  The  production 
complementarities  mechanism  requires  some  coordination.  If  production  complementarities  make 
studying  more  productive  and  valuable,  then  in  order  to  take  advantage  of  the  complementarities 
individuals must visit the study room at the same time. Similarly, those facing a commitment problem 
may use coordination to overcome their self-control problem. Since we have data on visit times, we can 
test whether we observe coordination of this type.  
In Table 7, we test whether subjects in the team treatment go to the study hall at the same time as 
their  teammates  much  more  often  than  would  random  pairs  of  “placebo”  teammates.  In  the  team 
treatment, there were 26 instances in which a subject showed up at the study hall at about the same-time 
(plus or minus 10 minutes) as a teammate. For comparative purposes, we randomly assigned placebo 
‘teammates’ to all subjects in the team treatment within classes. For the placebo pairings, there were 10 
instances of simultaneous visits. There were thus 16 additional simultaneous visits associated with true 
teammate pairings for the 168 subjects in the team treatment. This accounts for only 0.095 visits per 
subject, a very small impact. The difference in visits between team treatment and individual treatment 
was more than 6 times larger, at 0.606 visits per subject. These few visits associated with coordination 
                                                 
20 For some models of self-control and commitment, see Laibson (1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001), Gul 
and Pesendorfer (2001), Bénabou and Tirole (2004), Fudenberg and Levine (2006), and Ozdenoren, Salant, and 
Silverman (2012). For empirical and experimental work on this topic, see DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), 
Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006), Burger, Charness, and Lynham (2011), and Houser, Schunk, Winter, and Xiao 
(2009).   21 
could explain only about 18 percent of the estimated social parameter,  , in Table 6. We conclude that 
mechanisms requiring coordination explain at most a small part of the effectiveness of the team treatment.  
We do not find strong evidence, then, that effectiveness of team incentives in our setting arises 
from production complementarities or a need for commitment mechanisms related to joint  study hall 
attendance.  This  leaves  guilt,  shame,  altruism,  embarrassment,  fear  of  reprisal,  commitment  devices 
unrelated to joint attendance, and other social factors as possible mechanisms. 
Distinguishing more finely between these subtle channels is a subject for future research. One 
might imagine that manipulation of subjects’ interaction with their teammates may be interesting line of 
study. For instance, a face-to-face meeting with a teammate may have a larger effect on inducing effort 
than an online meeting. Understanding how these effects operate is useful—for example, workers at a 
workplace may not necessarily have in-person meetings with their co-workers but instead be in different 
physical environments.   
  Are  the  observed  social  effects  an  artifact  of  the  pay-for-study  environment?  In  any  field 
experiment, generalizability is a concern. It is worth investigating, then, whether there is evidence of 
social effects of team incentives in other effort-elicitation contexts, beyond the library. Our pay-for-
exercise field experiment, the results of which are reported in the next section, parallels the analysis above 
in a different context.  
 
5. Empirical Results – Pay for Exercise 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
  Panel A of Table 8 shows sample means of descriptive characteristics by treatment status for all 
subjects  who  filled  out  the  in-class  survey  for  the  exercise  experiment.  There  were  no  statistically 
significant  differences  between  average  characteristics  of  subjects  randomized  into  the  individual 
treatment, the group treatment, or the control group (Panel A). We report two measures of exercise for the 
pre-treatment period. “Self-Reported Exercise” is the number of times per week that individuals claim to 
have exercised during the previous month. Previous gym visits is the number of times subjects went to the   22 
Rec Center in the week prior to the treatment period, based on data provided by the Rec Center. For the 
remainder of the paper, we focus on the second pre-treatment measure, as it is not self-reported and 
relates more directly to the outcome we incentivize in the experiment: usage of the Rec Center.  
  Not all subjects chose to participate in the second stage of the experiment (i.e., come outside of 
class)  at  which  point  they  formally  became  a  part  of  the  experiment  and  learned  their  treatment 
assignment. As displayed in Panel B, 364 of the 479 students who filled out surveys in class, or about 76 
percent, went on to participate in the experiment, net of exclusions. There were no statistically significant 
differences in age or gender between participants and non-participants. However, participants were more 
apt to have used the Rec Center before, on average, than non-participants. We infer that this is the case 
either because subjects who are energetic enough to come outside for a lottery are also more apt to have 
the self-discipline to go to the Rec Center, or because students inferred from the survey questions that the 
experiment might be about exercise. Inferences now will be based on the sample of participants. We draw 
no conclusions about the 24 percent of in class-responders who were non-participants and who appear to 
have been less likely to go to the gym, on average. However, our sample population includes many 
individuals  who  are  similar  to  these  non-participants  at  least  in  terms  of  observable  dimensions—
potentially allowing us to infer the effect of the incentive schemes on these non-participants. 
  Panel  C  shows  sample  means  of  descriptive  characteristics  by  treatment  status  for  the  364 
subjects who participated in the experiment. Average age, self-reported exercise, and previous Rec Center 
visits do not differ significantly between group treatment, individual treatment, and control groups. The 
randomization was such that more males ended up in the group treatment than in either of the other two 
groups. However, conclusions from regressions reported in the remainder of the paper are not sensitive to 
the inclusion or omission of age and gender controls.  
 
B. Results 
  In Table 9, analogous to Table 4, we report mean effort outcomes by treatment status. Control 
subjects in the sample visited the Rec Center 2.1 times on average during the treatment period. 52 percent   23 
of the control subjects showed up to the Rec Center at least once, and 17 percent reached the 5-visit bonus 
threshold. We see that subjects responded to the incentives provided by the treatments. Subjects in the 
individual and team treatments made about 1.7 more and 2.0 more visits to the Rec Center, respectively, 
during the treatment period than did controls. They were also 16 and 30 percentage points more likely, 
respectively, to have gone to the Rec Center at least once and about 38 and 39 percentage points more 
likely to have met the 5-visit bonus payment threshold. Figure 2 shows the distribution of Rec Center 
visits during the treatment period, by treatment. We emphasize the  noticeable rightward shift of the 
distribution for team and individual treatments relative to the distribution of the control group and that of 
the non-participants. In short, both incentive schemes produced an effect: Incentivized subjects went to 
the Rec Center more than non-incentivized subjects.  
  Table  10,  analogous  to  Table  5,  shows  that  the  effects  persist  in  a  regression  setting  with 
additional covariates, based on the regression model (equation (2)). Evidence that the team and individual 
compensation  schemes  evoked  significantly  different  responses  is  visible  in  the  set  of  no  controls 
regressions, column 2: Subjects randomized into the team-incentive scheme were 14.3 percentage points 
more likely to have visited the Rec Center during the treatment period than subjects in the individual 
treatment, and the difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Unlike in the study room 
experiment, the rate of bonus-earning in the team treatment for the exercise was about the same as in the 
individual treatment. However, even though team and individual treatments evoked very similar task 
completion rates in this setting, the team treatment cost substantially less per visit, just as in the pay-for-
study setting. The average per visit cost for the team treatment was $3.89, whereas the average per visit 
cost for the individual treatment was $5.23, or 31 percent higher. The team incentive again elicited similar 
effort at lower cost per person.  
  Further, the results in Tables 9 and 10 contain evidence on the existence of a social effect of the 
team incentive. The risk of a partner’s default in the team treatment was 44 percent. Despite this high risk 
of default, subjects in teams were just as likely to put forth effort to earn bonuses as subjects for whom   24 
there was no default risk (i.e., those who had no teammate). We will show that this requires a large social 
effect, though not as large an effect as was found in the study hall experiment.  
  In the exercise experiment, participants may have had fairly good ex-ante measures of Rec Center 
attendance, as observable physical fitness may have given subjects a good indication of their partner’s 
propensity to exercise. In contrast, propensity to study may have been harder for subjects to observe. If 
gym-going  propensity  is  indeed  easily  observed,  then  one  might  imagine  there  are  heterogeneous 
treatment  effects,  by  type  and  partner  type.  In  Table  11,  we  show  heterogeneous  effects—dividing 
individuals into “active” types, who visited the Rec Center in the pre-treatment period, and “inactive” 
types, who did not.   
On balance, the coefficients on team treatment in Panels B and C reveal that active types go to the 
Rec Center more when incentivized as individuals and inactive types show up more when incentivized in 
the team setting. We investigate differences between active types and inactive types by partner type in 
Panels D and E. In Panel D, the point estimates on team treatment are all negative, indicating that active 
types  go  to  the  Rec  Center  less  when  incentivized  in  teams  than  when  incentivized  as  individuals, 
regardless of partner type. For actives, responses to changes in expected own monetary payoff appear to 
dominate social effects.  
Panel E, however, tells a very different story for the inactive types. This panel reports results for 
the inactive types—individuals who are less likely, ex ante, to go to the gym, and for whom these external 
incentives are more likely to be a decisive factor. Focusing on the specification with no controls (columns 
1-3),  inactive  types  with  active  types  as  partners  go  to  the  Rec  Center  1.49  more  times,  are  21.6 
percentage points more likely to go at least once, and are 25.5 percentage points more likely to meet the 
5-visit bonus threshold than inactive types incentivized as individuals. This occurs despite the fact that the 
expected monetary pay-off is lower than in the individual treatment. A large non-pecuniary effect must 
exist for these choices to make sense. However, interestingly, inactive types randomly partnered with 
inactive types do not behave in this way. The team treatment is less strong when an inactive type is 
matched with another inactive as opposed to being matched to an active type.  We take this as clear   25 
evidence that subjects estimate the probability of default by their partners, based on observables. Own 
expected pay-out matters, but so too do social factors.  
   
C. The Social Effect 
Exactly as in the analysis of the study hall experiment, we use the model defined by equations (3) 
and (4) to estimate pecuniary and social components of utility for the exercise experiment. Table 12 
displays the results. The estimates imply that subjects received a utility gain of 1.29 utils from their own 
pecuniary benefit of being paid $35, and received a utility gain of 2.17 utils from pecuniary and social 
benefits together. Bootstrapped confidence intervals indicate that both estimates are distinguishable from 
zero  at  the  5  percent  level.  The  social  parameter,  ,  is  estimated  to  be  0.68  and  is  statistically 
distinguishable from zero at the 5 percent level. Subjects choose their effort as if they valued a marginal 
dollar  of  compensation  for  their  teammate  as  much  as  they  value  68  cents  of  compensation  for 
themselves. The social impact of team compensation, then, is large enough to compensate for the 0.44 
probability of teammate default, and is two thirds as large as the effect of own pecuniary compensation.  
Panel B of Table 12 shows the estimated social effect for various focal beliefs about partner 
default. If subjects are wrong in their belief about teammate defaults, and instead believe their teammates 
will meet the bonus threshold with certainty, there is no social effect. In such a case, subjects would put 
forth effort in the team treatment simply because they believe they’d earn the bonus. However, if the 
subjects are correct on average about partner performance (the remaining two estimates of  ), the social 
component of utility is large. 
Exactly as in study room setting, production complementarities and commitment mechanisms do 
not appear to explain the social factor. The Rec Center data contain information on the precise time of the 
Rec Center visit. As reported in Table 13, in the team treatment, there were 14 instances in which a 
subject showed up at the Rec Center at about the same-time (plus or minus 10 minutes) as a teammate. 
For the placebo pairings, there were 6 instances of simultaneous visits. There were thus 8 additional 
simultaneous visits associated with true teammate pairings for the 190 subjects in the team treatment. This   26 
accounts for only 0.04 visits per subject, and accounts for at most 7 percent of additional bonus-earning 
behavior. Again, we conclude that that mechanisms requiring coordination explain at most a very small 
part of the effectiveness of the team treatment in the exercise setting.  
In short, social effects of team incentives do not appear to be an idiosyncratic feature of being 
paid  to  study.  We  find  large  social  effects  in  both  the  pay-for-study  and  pay-for-exercise  settings; 
however, the effect is larger in for the pay-for-study intervention. 
    
7. Conclusion  
Incentives that offer direct pay for behavior have been studied extensively and found to produce 
modest results, at best. However, there is not much credible empirical work on behavior interventions that 
compensate  individuals  for  team  behavior.  Management  consultants  allege  that  team  compensation 
harnesses a powerful social mechanism, that individuals will perform actions for their team that they 
would be unwilling to perform strictly for themselves. If this is true, in part or in total, then it should be 
taken into account in designing interventions that seek to elicit effort.  
A first step is to observe the effect in simple settings that allow for rigorous causal inference but 
also preserve the possibility of repeated social interactions over time. Our primary contribution is that we 
demonstrate the existence of a social effect of team compensation: We observe people in two real-world 
settings  raising  their  effort  level because a  teammate’s  payoff  is  at  stake.  Findings  indicate that  the 
magnitude of this effect can be considerably larger than that of own pecuniary compensation. In addition, 
the team incentive scheme in our experiment was 26 percent to 31 percent more cost effective than the 
individual incentive.  
  Ultimately,  this  study  examines  a  crucial  issue  related  to  the  optimal  structure  of  incentive 
schemes and how best to use incentives to elicit behaviors at lowest cost. We have just scratched the 
surface on this crucial issue. Future work will help to understand more fully the mechanisms and the 
environments under which team incentives are most effective.   27 
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 Appendix A: Details of Experimental Design 
Pay for Studying Experiment 
Subjects were recruited at the beginning of 17 Economics classes and 1 Psychology class at 
University of California Santa Barbara (UCSB), during the fall quarter of 2011. All sign-ups for 
the experiment occurred about two weeks into the quarter (October 3-7). The first stage of 
recruitment involved asking students to fill out a brief survey at the beginning of each lecture 
(Appendix B contains an in-class survey).
1 Students were told that they would be entered in a 
draw to win $50 if they filled out the survey. In order to claim the $50 they were also told that 
they would have to bring the bottom portion of their survey (which they were instructed to tear 
off and keep) and be present at the drawing that would take place outside the lecture hall after 
class.  
 
All surveys had a unique identification code. From the perspective of the students this appeared 
to be an alphanumeric code for the lottery to be held after class. For our purposes, it was a 
random code that identified treatment group and, in the case of the team treatment, potential 
partners. Survey identification codes included an A, B, C, D, E, or F as the first character, 
followed by a number. The letter indicated group assignment. For example, A might indicate 
control group, B individual treatment, C and D anonymous treatment, and E and F team 
treatment. We rotated the letter-experimental group match across classes to ensure that students 
in subsequent classes could not successfully inform their friends about what specific letters 
meant. The letter codes were not explained to students prior to their arrival after class and were 
designed to look like a random raffle identifier, or even go unnoticed, until described after class. 
There is no evidence that students were able to infer their treatment status from these codes or 
that the codes influenced their decision to participate: There were no significant differences in 
participation rates between treatment groups. 
 
Subjects were informed of their treatment status both verbally at the end of class and via email. 
The study room seats about 100 people, so the researchers can visibly see who arrives and leaves 
the room.  
 
Assignment of Team Treatment 
 
To facilitate rapid pairing, the in-class team treatment surveys had a built-in paring; for example, 
if subjects with sign-up forms with letters C and D in their alphanumeric code, students with the 
same number would automatically be matched with each other. For example, if C8 and D8 both 
show up after class, they would be matched together. Subjects with a “partner” who did not show 
up after lecture were randomly re-matched with another subject without a “partner.”
2  
 
                                                 
1 All surveys, for all treatment groups, came from a randomized pile. This ensured that subjects did not know with 
whom they were matched until after lecture, and that subjects were not sitting near their potential partner (except by 
random chance).  
2 This was done by matching in ascending sequential order. If C10 showed up but not D10 and the next unmatched 
group treatment number was C12, we matched C10 and C12. This preserves randomization since surveys were 
distributed randomly in class. In the few circumstances in which this process left a group treatment participant 
without a partner, we randomly selected a control group member to pair with her/him. B. Experimental Design, Pay for Exercise 
 
Subjects were recruited during and after lectures in all nine Economics classes at University of 
California Santa Barbara (UCSB), during the second six-week summer session in 2010. All sign-
ups for the experiment occurred during week one (August 3-6). The sign-up process only 
differed slightly from that for the library experiment.  
 
Assignment of Team Treatment 
 
Subjects with the same alphanumeric code were matched when possible (e.g. C1 and C1*), with 
random re-matching when the potential partner did not show up outside. 
 
Subjects were informed that payments would be made in week five of the six-week session. Just 
as in the library study, we wanted to ensure that subjects in the team treatment knew that they 
would potentially see their partners after the partner knew if the bonus threshold was reached. 
 
C. Measuring Visits 
 
One benefit of the library experimental design is that it allows for study room visits to be 
supervised by a researcher or research assistant. Logs were kept every day to determine who 
studied at the study room each day. Identities were checked by photo identification at check-in. 
When a subject asked if another subject had visited the study room, the person with access to the 
daily log would deny the subject’s request. 
 
In the case of Rec Center attendance, we used electronic collection. Whenever anyone wishes to 
enter the Rec Center the attendant at the front desk takes her or his student photo ID card and 
electronically scans it. The time, date, and student card barcode of every gym entry is stored 
electronically. The Rec Center generously provided us with data that included all gym visits for 
every in-class survey respondent from July 21 through August 20, 2010. Because the Rec Center 
has the universe of student names and identification numbers they also verified for us that every 
student who filled out an in-class survey was in their database. In other words, there are no cases 























1.  In-Class Consent Form and Survey 
 
2.  Participant Consent Forms 
a.  Control Group 
b.  Individual Treatment 
c.  Team Treatment 





1.  In-Class Consent Form and Survey 
 
2.  Participant Consent Forms 
a.  Control Group 
b.  Individual Treatment 
c.  Team Treatment 
            F1 
_________________________          ________________________      F1 
Print last name                                    first name 
Hi, you are being asked to participate in a study by Philip Babcock, Kelly Bedard, Gary Charness, John Hartman, and Heather Royer. You 
must be at least 18 years old to participate. For your participation today, we will enter you in a random drawing, in which one person 
in this class will receive $50 cash today (photo ID required). 
 
We are conducting a study to analyze monetary incentives to study.  By signing up for this experiment, you are acknowledging that the 
authors of this study will follow your academic records at UCSB from the beginning of your enrollment through Summer 2012. By 
participating in the study, you will be given monetary incentives for studying at a given location at UCSB. In some cases, monetary 
incentives will depend solely on your attendance. In other cases, the monetary incentives will depend partially on your attendance and 
partially on the attendance of you and one other person. In this case, you may or may not be notified of the identity of your partner. 
 
I am aware that in this study, I allow Philip Babcock, Kelly Bedard, Gary  Charness,  John Hartman, Heather Royer, and research 
assistants related to this study, to access my academic records at UCSB through Summer 2012. I am aware that my UCSB student 
number will be used to link survey and study data. It will not be used for any other purpose nor will any information ever be made 
public. That being said, absolute confidentiality cannot be guaranteed, since research documents are not protected from subpoena. 
 
We would also like to ask you a few questions: 
 
What is your sex?      M  F 
 
How old are you?    18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  other_______ 
                        (indicate age) 
 
Over the last 7 days, how many HOURS did you study in TOTAL (outside of class time)?  ____________ 
                      (indicate hours) 
 
Over the last 7 days, how many DAYS did you study for 40 minutes or more ANYWHERE in the library? 
 
  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
Over the last 7 days, how many DAYS did you study for 40 minutes or more in the 24-HOUR STUDY ROOM in the library? The 24-hour 
study room is located near the main entrance to the library. 
 
  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
Please state whether you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
  “I encounter difficulties motivating myself to study.” (Circle one of the answers below) 
 
        
 
Strongly                   Disagree              Somewhat                  Neutral              Somewhat                  Agree                   Strongly                                                    
Disagree                                                 Disagree                                                    Agree                                                      Agree 
 
       
__________________________         _____________________________   October _____, 2011   ____________________ 
Print name                     Signature        Date      Perm #   
 
______________________________________________________    ___________________________ 






 You have been selected to earn additional money for attendance at the 24-hour study room in the library. You will 
receive $2 per study visit for up to 4 visits in the specified 2-week treatment period. Only one visit per day is 
eligible for payment. In order for a study visit to count, students must log in with a researcher posted in the 24-
hour study room and remain in the study room for at least 40 minutes before logging out with the researcher. We 
will man the 24-hour study room from 11:00am to 7:00pm Monday through Friday from October 10-21, 2011. 
Students must log in by 6:20pm for the visit to qualify.  
 
We will pay you for qualifying study room visits in approximately four weeks. You will receive an e-mail in about 
three weeks with more information.  
 
Your participation is voluntary. There will be no repercussions should you decide not to participate. Please note 
that you may withdraw your participation at any time, and you will be paid based on your attendance at the study 
room up to the point that you withdraw from participating. If you have any questions, you may contact Philip 
Babcock at babcock@econ.ucsb.edu or 805-893-4823, or John Hartman at hartman@econ.ucsb.edu.  
 
If you have any questions concerning any matter relating to your participation, you may also call the University of 
California Santa Barbara Human Subjects committee at 805-893-3807.  
 





Signature_____________________________________  Print name____________________________________ 
 
 You have been selected to earn additional money for attendance at the 24-hour study room in the library. You will 
receive $2 per study visit for up to 4 visits in the specified 2-week treatment period. Only one visit per day is 
eligible for payment. In order for a study visit to count, students must log in with a researcher posted in the 24-
hour study room and remain in the study room for at least 40 minutes before logging out with the researcher. We 
will man the 24-hour study room from 11:00am to 7:00pm Monday through Friday from October 10-21, 2011. 
Students must log in by 6:20pm for the visit to qualify.  
 
If you have qualifying visits on at least 4 different days from October 10-21 you will earn an additional $25.  
 
We will pay you for qualifying study room visits in approximately four weeks. You will receive an e-mail in about 
three weeks with more information.  
 
Your participation is voluntary. There will be no repercussions should you decide not to participate. Please note 
that you may withdraw your participation at any time, and you will be paid based on your attendance at the study 
room up to the point that you withdraw from participating. If you have any questions, you may contact Philip 
Babcock at babcock@econ.ucsb.edu or 805-893-4823, or John Hartman at hartman@econ.ucsb.edu.  
 
If you have any questions concerning any matter relating to your participation, you may also call the University of 
California Santa Barbara Human Subjects committee at 805-893-3807.  
 





Signature_____________________________________  Print name____________________________________ 
 
 You have been selected to earn additional money for attendance at the 24-hour study room in the library. You will 
receive $2 per study visit for up to 4 visits in the specified 2-week treatment period. Only one visit per day is 
eligible for payment. In order for a study visit to count, students must log in with a researcher posted in the 24-
hour study room and remain in the study room for at least 40 minutes before logging out with the researcher. We 
will man the 24-hour study room from 11:00am to 7:00pm Monday through Friday from October 10-21, 2011. 
Students must log in by 6:20pm for the visit to qualify. 
 
You have also been matched with another person for this part of the study. If both of you have qualifying visits on 
at least 4 different days from October 10-21 you will both earn an additional $25. Note that if either one of you 
does not meet this requirement, the $50 that you could have collectively earned is lost.  
 
We will pay you for qualifying study room visits in approximately four weeks. You will receive an e-mail in about 
three weeks with more information.  
 
Your participation is voluntary. There will be no repercussions should you decide not to participate. Please note 
that you may withdraw your participation at any time, and you will be paid based on your attendance at the study 
room up to the point that you withdraw from participating. If you have any questions, you may contact Philip 
Babcock at babcock@econ.ucsb.edu or 805-893-4823, or John Hartman at hartman@econ.ucsb.edu.  
 
If you have any questions concerning any matter relating to your participation, you may also call the University of 
California Santa Barbara Human Subjects committee at 805-893-3807.  
 




Partner’s name ___________________________________________  
 
 
My Signature______________________________   Print my name_________________________ 
 
 
My number (e.g. B6) ________________________   Partner’s number ______________________ 










Partner’s name ___________________________________________  
 You have been selected to earn additional money for attendance at the 24-hour study room in the library. You will 
receive $2 per study visit for up to 4 visits in the specified 2-week treatment period. Only one visit per day is 
eligible for payment. In order for a study visit to count, students must log in with a researcher posted in the 24-
hour study room and remain in the study room for at least 40 minutes before logging out with the researcher. We 
will man the 24-hour study room from 11:00am to 7:00pm Monday through Friday from October 10-21, 2011. 
Students must log in by 6:20pm for the visit to qualify. 
 
You will be matched with another person from another class for this part of the study. The identity of your partner 
will not be revealed to you or your partner – it is entirely anonymous. If both of you have qualifying visits on at 
least 4 different days from October 10-21 you will both earn an additional $25. Note that if either one of you does 
not meet this requirement, the $50 that you could have collectively earned is lost.  
 
We will pay you for qualifying study room visits in approximately four weeks. You will receive an e-mail in about 
three weeks with more information.  
 
Your participation is voluntary. There will be no repercussions should you decide not to participate. Please note 
that you may withdraw your participation at any time, and you will be paid based on your attendance at the study 
room up to the point that you withdraw from participating. If you have any questions, you may contact Philip 
Babcock at babcock@econ.ucsb.edu or 805-893-4823, or John Hartman at hartman@econ.ucsb.edu.  
 
If you have any questions concerning any matter relating to your participation, you may also call the University of 
California Santa Barbara Human Subjects committee at 805-893-3807.  
 




Signature______________________________   Print name_________________________ 
 
   A1* 
A1                                 _______________    _______________ 
                                                                                                       Print last name          first name                     *   
Hi, you are being asked to participate in a study by Philip Babcock, Kelly Bedard, Gary Charness, John Hartman, 
and Heather Royer. You must be at least 18 years old to participate. For your participation today, we will enter you 
in a random drawing, in which one person in this class will receive $50 cash today (subject to presentation of photo 
ID).  
 
We are conducting a study to analyze monetary incentives to exercise. By signing up for this experiment, you are 
acknowledging that the authors of this study will follow your attendance at the UCSB Recreation Center (“Rec 
Center”) for June through September 2010. By participating in the study, you may be randomly selected to earn 
money for attending the Rec Center. In some cases, the monetary incentives will depend solely on your attendance. 
In other cases, the monetary incentives will depend partially on your attendance and partially on the attendance of 
you and one other person (whom you will be notified about if you are selected).  
 
I am aware that in this study, I allow Philip Babcock, Kelly Bedard, Gary Charness, John Hartman, Heather Royer, 
and research assistants related to this study, to access my attendance records at the UCSB Recreation Center for June 
to September 2010.  
 
I also acknowledge the following information: Exercise has potential risks and benefits. Before starting any exercise 
program, you may want to consider contacting a doctor or other professional qualified to help determine what types 
of exercise are appropriate for you. When exercise is tailored to your physical condition and health, the gains from 
exercise usually outweigh the costs. Please also note that pregnancy may complicate the type and amount of exercise 
that you need. If you are pregnant or plan on becoming pregnant in the next six weeks, or if you are 17 years old or 
younger, you are not allowed to participate in this study.  
 
After making payment to participants, all identifiers will be immediately removed from the data. The anonymized 
attendance records will be kept in a locked drawer in the office of Gary Charness.  
 
 
We would also like to ask you a few questions:  
 
What is your sex?   M   F  
 
How old are you?   18  19   20   21   22   23   24   25   other_______  
 
In the last month, how many times per week did you moderately or vigorously exercise for 30 minutes or more?  
 




_____________________    ____________________________   August _____, 2010  
Print name        Signature         Date        
 
 
_____________________    __________________________     ______________________ 






 You have been selected to receive information on the benefits of exercise.  
 
Exercise has potential risks and benefits. Before starting any exercise program, you may want to consider 
contacting a doctor or other professional qualified to help determine what types of exercise are 
appropriate for you. When exercise is tailored to your physical condition and health, the gains from 
exercise usually outweigh the costs. Please also note that pregnancy may complicate the type and amount 
of exercise that you need.  
 
If you have any questions, you may contact Philip Babcock at babcock@econ.ucsb.edu or 805-893-4823, 
or John Hartman at hartman@econ.ucsb.edu.  
 
If you have any questions concerning any matter relating to your participation, you may also call the 
University of California Santa Barbara Human Subjects committee at 805-893-3807.  
 
The University of California does not provide compensation for injury to human subjects of research 
except that the University will provide for any medical care required to treat any injury resulting from 
participation as a human subject in a University-approved activity. If you have any questions concerning 
this or any other matter relating to your participation in this activity, please call 893-3807.  
 
By signing below, I acknowledge the above information. I will also do the following immediately if I 
become pregnant or suspect that I am pregnant:  
• Stop attending the UCSB Recreation Center.  





Signature______________________________   Print name_________________________ 
 
 
 You have been selected to earn additional money from attendance at the UCSB Recreation Center (“Rec 
Center”). From August 7-20, 2010, you will earn $2 for exercising at the Rec Center on any of these 
dates, up to $10. If you attend the Rec Center at least five different days from August 7-20, 2010, you will 
earn an additional $25.  
 
We will pay you for qualifying Rec Center visits in approximately four weeks. You will receive an e-mail 
in about three weeks with more information.  
 
Recall the following information that you acknowledged earlier today: Exercise has potential risks and 
benefits. Before starting any exercise program, you may want to consider contacting a doctor or other 
professional qualified to help determine what types of exercise are appropriate for you. When exercise is 
tailored to your physical condition and health, the gains from exercise usually outweigh the costs. Please 
also note that pregnancy may complicate the type and amount of exercise that you need. If you are 
pregnant or plan on becoming pregnant in the next six weeks you are not allowed to participate in this 
exercise study.  
 
Your exercise participation is voluntary. There will be no repercussions should you decide not to 
participate. Please note that you may withdraw your participation at any time, and you will be paid based 
on your attendance at the Rec Center up to the point that you withdraw from participating. If you have any 
questions, you may contact Philip Babcock at babcock@econ.ucsb.edu or 805-893-4823, or John 
Hartman at hartman@econ.ucsb.edu.  
 
If you have any questions concerning any matter relating to your participation, you may also call the 
University of California Santa Barbara Human Subjects committee at 805-893-3807.  
 
The University of California does not provide compensation for injury to human subjects of research 
except that the University will provide for any medical care required to treat any injury resulting from 
participation as a human subject in a University-approved activity. If you have any questions concerning 
this or any other matter relating to your participation in this activity, please call 893-3807.  
 
By signing below, I acknowledge the above information. I will also do the following immediately if I 
become pregnant or suspect that I am pregnant:  
• Stop attending the UCSB Recreation Center.  





Signature______________________________   Print name_________________________ 
 
 You have been selected to earn additional money from attendance at the UCSB Recreation Center (“Rec 
Center”). From August 7-20, 2010, you will earn $2 for exercising at the Rec Center on any of these 
dates, up to $10. You have also been matched with another person for this part of the study. If both of you 
attend the Rec Center at least five different days from August 7-20, 2010, you will each earn an additional 
$25. Note that if either one of you does not meet this requirement, the $50 that you could have 
collectively earned is lost.  
 
We will pay you for qualifying Rec Center visits in approximately four weeks. You will receive an e-mail 
in about three weeks with more information.  
 
Recall the following information that you acknowledged earlier today: Exercise has potential risks and 
benefits. Before starting any exercise program, you may want to consider contacting a doctor or other 
professional qualified to help determine what types of exercise are appropriate for you. When exercise is 
tailored to your physical condition and health, the gains from exercise usually outweigh the costs. Please 
also note that pregnancy may complicate the type and amount of exercise that you need. If you are 
pregnant or plan on becoming pregnant in the next six weeks you are not allowed to participate in this 
exercise study.  
 
Your exercise participation is voluntary. There will be no repercussions should you decide not to 
participate. Please note that you may withdraw your participation at any time, and you will be paid based 
on your attendance at the Rec Center up to the point that you withdraw from participating. If you have any 
questions, you may contact Philip Babcock at babcock@econ.ucsb.edu or 805-893-4823, or John 
Hartman at hartman@econ.ucsb.edu.  
 
If you have any questions concerning any matter relating to your participation, you may also call the 
University of California Santa Barbara Human Subjects committee at 805-893-3807.  
 
The University of California does not provide compensation for injury to human subjects of research 
except that the University will provide for any medical care required to treat any injury resulting from 
participation as a human subject in a University-approved activity. If you have any questions concerning 
this or any other matter relating to your participation in this activity, please call 893-3807.  
 
By signing below, I acknowledge the above information. I will also do the following immediately if I 
become pregnant or suspect that I am pregnant:  
• Stop attending the UCSB Recreation Center.  
• Notify one of the researchers listed above.  
 
  
Partner’s name ___________________________________________  
 
 
Signature______________________________   Print name_________________________ 
 





Partner’s name ___________________________________________  
  
Notes: Number of visits=4 denotes number of visits equal to 4 or more. 
 













































0 5Table 1. Study Room Samples
Official Survey Experiment
Course Number Enrollment Respondents Participants
Econ 101 205 40 20
Econ 106 91 32 27
Econ 114 85 22 13
Econ 118 58 13 10
Econ 122 145 34 23
Econ 130 54 37 22
Econ 132A 58 42 29
Econ 136A - 1 59 52 34
Econ 136A - 2 55 40 34
Econ 136B 76 60 41
Econ 137A 56 23 16
Econ 138A 118 38 24
Econ 140A 113 54 29
Econ 160 50 19 16
Econ 171 55 32 27
Econ 189 - 1 59 28 20
Econ 189 - 2 72 32 31
Psych 7 201 100 76
Total 1610 698 496
Removing 1 mismatched anonymous treatment 697 495
group member
Removing duplicate survey respondents 687 495
Removing individuals who left experiment in the  683 491
midst of treatment assignmentTable 2. Rec Center Samples
Official Survey Experiment
Economics Course Number Enrollment Respondents Participants
2 101 79 62
3B 119 85 66
100B 83 35 21
101 79 76 58
114 62 47 39
118 62 37 28
136A 48 33 21
136B 55 41 30
136C 75 60 50
Total 684 493 375
Removing individuals and their contaminated partners  490 373
who left experiment in the midst of treatment assignment
Removing duplicate survey respondents and their  480 364
contaminated partners
Removing respondent who gave a fake name 479 364Table 3. Study Room Survey Response and Experiment Participation
Library
Male Age Days Sample
Panel A: Classroom Survey Response
Sample Means
Control (C) 0.65 21.04 1.70 111
(0.48) (1.48) (1.98)
Individual Treatment (IT) 0.57 21.22 1.81 109
(0.50) (1.48) (1.77)
Team Treatment (TT) 0.60 21.13 1.68 232
(0.49) (1.45) (1.88)
Anonymous Team Treatment (AT) 0.56 21.18 1.67 231
(0.50) (1.70) (1.81)
Mean Differences (P-Values)
IT - C 0.20 0.35 0.69
AT - C 0.11 0.42 0.89
AT - IT 0.91 0.82 0.52
TT - C 0.32 0.57 0.91
TT - IT 0.61 0.60 0.54
TT - AT 0.44 0.75 0.98
Panel B: Experiment Participation
Sample Means
Non-Participants (NP) 0.57 21.42 1.77 192
(0.50) (1.80) (2.01)
Participants (P) 0.60 21.04 1.67 491
(0.49) (1.43) (1.79)
Mean Differences (P-Values)
P - NP 0.46 0.01 0.56
Panel C: Treatment Assignment Conditional on Participation
Sample Means
Control 0.60 20.93 1.51 75
(0.49) (1.40) (1.78)
Individual Treatment 0.59 21.13 1.82 82
(0.49) (1.39) (1.81)
Team Treatment 0.64 21.02 1.67 172
(0.48) (1.27) (1.83)
Anonymous Team Treatment (AT) 0.57 21.07 1.68 162
(0.50) (1.61) (1.76)
Mean Differences (P-Values)
IT - C 0.85 0.37 0.28
AT - C 0.61 0.51 0.50
AT - IT 0.76 0.74 0.56
TT - C 0.55 0.63 0.50
TT - IT 0.41 0.54 0.99
TT - AT 0.17 0.78 0.81
Standard deviations are in parentheses. P-values are for two-sided t-tests assuming unequal variances for 
continuous variables and two-sample proportion tests for discrete variables. Some sample sizes vary slightly due 
to non-reporting for specific variables.Table 4. Study Room Visits by Treatment Group
Visits Try Bonus Sample
Control (C) 1.33 0.40 0.19 75
(2.04) (0.49) (0.39)
Individual Treatment (IT) 2.22 0.57 0.40 82
(2.32) (0.49) (0.49)
Team Treatment (TT) 2.83 0.70 0.57 172
(2.18) (0.46) (0.50)
Anonymous Team Treatment (AT) 1.75 0.49 0.33 162
(2.06) (0.50) (0.47)
Mean/Proportion Differences (P-Values)
IT - C 0.01 0.03 0.00
AT - C 0.14 0.18 0.03
AT - IT 0.13 0.24 0.25
TT - C 0.00 0.00 0.00
TT - IT 0.05 0.05 0.01
TT - AT 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard deviations are in parentheses. P-values are for two-sided t-tests assuming unequal variances 
for continuous variables and two-sample proportion tests for discrete variables.Table 5. Study Room Visits for Individual, Team Treatments, and Anonymous Team Treatments
Visits Try Bonus Visits Try Bonus Visits Try Bonus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Any Treatment 0.886** 0.173* 0.216** 0.850** 0.164** 0.217** 0.768** 0.149* 0.199**
(0.347) (0.079) (0.071) (0.345) (0.079) (0.072) (0.352) (0.081) (0.073)
Team Treatment 0.606* 0.125* 0.167** 0.622* 0.130* 0.164** 0.740** 0.148** 0.186**
(0.317) (0.067) (0.068) (0.321) (0.067) (0.069) (0.333) (0.072) (0.071)
Anonymous Team Treatment -0.466 -0.079 -0.075 -0.486* -0.084 -0.085 -0.444 -0.084 -0.079
(0.295) (0.065) (0.064) (0.294) (0.066) (0.065) (0.299) (0.070) (0.065)
Male -0.143 -0.054 -0.049 -0.153 -0.069 -0.044
(0.199) (0.047) (0.046) (0.204) (0.049) (0.047)
Age 20 -0.155 -0.040 -0.010 -0.382 -0.123 -0.029
(0.352) (0.081) (0.082) (0.397) (0.092) (0.096)
Age 21 -0.152 -0.056 0.013 -0.451 -0.142 -0.017
(0.330) (0.080) (0.077) (0.411) (0.097) (0.098)
Age 22 -0.377 -0.055 -0.114 -0.792 -0.154 -0.173
(0.411) (0.096) (0.087) (0.503) (0.115) (0.112)
Age 23+ -0.004 -0.006 0.023 -0.394 -0.111 -0.030
(0.428) (0.097) (0.097) (0.494) (0.110) (0.117)
Library Days 0.168** 0.033** 0.013 0.164** 0.032** 0.012
(0.064) (0.013) (0.013) (0.065) (0.013) (0.014)
Constant 1.333** 0.400** 0.187** 1.312** 0.423** 0.206** -- -- --
(0.235) (0.057) (0.045) (0.370) (0.091) (0.081)
No Controls With Controls With Controls and Class Fixed Effects
Sample size is 491. Standard errors are clustered at the group level and reported in parentheses. ** (*) indicates statistically significant at the 5 (10) percent level. Columns (4)-(9) also include 
indicators for missing age and sex.Table 6. Structural Estimates
95% Percentile 95% Percentile
Coefficient Lower Bound Upper Bound
Panel A - Structural parameters
Male 0.013 -0.290 0.320
Age 20 -0.123 -0.728 0.555
Age 21 0.171 -0.397 0.797
Age 22 -0.200 -0.890 0.568
Age 23+ 0.189 -0.506 0.938
Library Days 0.086 0.0002 0.181
Predicted partner bonus status 1.642 0.970 2.266
Individual treatment indicator 0.542 0.079 0.955
Constant -0.976 -1.678 -0.366
Theta 2.030 0.939 6.167
Panel B - Theta under different probability of completion assumptions
Theta: certainty 0.643 0.156 2.027
Theta: unconditional team treatment mean 1.883 1.029 4.312
Theta: unconditional control group mean 7.786 5.182 15.186
Panel C - Anonymous Treatment - Theta under different probability of completion assumptions
Theta: certainty -0.386 -0.797 0.059
Theta: unconditional anonymous treatment mean 0.864 -0.394 2.412
Theta: unconditional control group mean 2.284 0.088 4.661
1000 bootstrap replications. Sample excludes anonymous treatment group members and individuals with missing data for 
themselves or their partners. The sample size is 327.Table 7. Incidence of Pairs Visiting the Study Room Together
Number of Same
Time Visits Team Treatment Random Partner Team Treatment Random Partner
0 150 158 146 156
(89.3) (94.1) (86.9) (92.9)
1 14 10 18 10
(8.3) (6.0) (10.7) (6.0)
2 2 0 2 2
(1.2) (0.0) (1.2) (6.0)
3 0 0 0 0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
4 2 0 2 0
(1.2) (0.0) (1.2) (0.0)
Total 168 168 168 168
Same Time = +/- 10 Minutes Same Time = +/- 20 Minutes
Percentage of visits in pairs in parentheses. Random partners are random 'pairs' within class within the team treatment.Table 8. Rec Center Survey Response and Experiment Participation
Self-Reported Previous Sample
Male Age Exercise Gym Visits Size
Panel A: Classroom Survey Response
Sample Means
Control (C) 0.59 21.19 3.80 1.01 112
(0.49) (2.24) (2.21) (1.55)
Individual Treatment (IT) 0.57 21.39 4.30 1.05 116
(0.50) (2.72) (2.63) (1.59)
Team Treatment (TT) 0.65 21.09 4.19 1.04 251
(0.48) (2.16) (2.48) (1.40)
Mean Differences (P-Values)
IT - C 0.69 0.55 0.12 0.84
TT - C 0.27 0.69 0.15 0.86
TT - IT 0.11 0.29 0.69 0.95
Panel B: Experiment Participation
Sample Means
Non-Participants (NP) 0.64 21.26 4.13 0.80 115
(0.48) (2.43) (2.51) (1.33)
Participants (P) 0.61 21.16 4.13 1.11 364
(0.49) (2.30) (2.45) (1.52)
Mean Differences (P-Values)
P - NP 0.56 0.71 1.00 0.04
Panel C: Treatment Assignment Conditional on Participation
Sample Means
Control 0.55 21.14 3.98 1.17 87
(0.50) (2.43) (2.29) (1.65)
Individual Treatment 0.54 21.24 4.16 1.17 87
(0.50) (2.19) (2.49) (1.69)
Team Treatment 0.67 21.14 4.18 1.05 190
(0.47) (2.30) (2.51) (1.38)
Mean Differences (P-Values)
IT - C 0.88 0.77 0.62 1.00
TT - C 0.05 0.99 0.51 0.56
TT - IT 0.03 0.71 0.94 0.56
Standard deviations are in parentheses. P-values are for two-sided t-tests assuming unequal variances for continuous 
variables and two-sample proportion tests for discrete variables. Some sample sizes vary slightly due to non-reporting 
for specific variables.Table 9. Rec Center Visits by Treatment Group
Visits Try Bonus Sample
Control (C) 2.13 0.52 0.17 87
(2.99) (0.50) (0.38)
Individual Treatment (IT) 3.82 0.68 0.55 87
(3.23) (0.47) (0.50)
Team Treatment (TT) 4.16 0.82 0.56 190
(2.78) (0.38) (0.50)
Mean/Proportion Differences (P-Values)
IT - C 0.00 0.03 0.00
TT - C 0.00 0.00 0.00
TT - IT 0.39 0.01 0.86
Standard deviations are in parentheses. P-values are for two-sided t-tests assuming unequal variances 
for continuous variables and two-sample proportion tests for discrete variables.Table 10. Rec Center Visits for Individual and Team Treatments
Visits Try Bonus Visits Try Bonus Visits Try Bonus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Any Treatment 1.690** 0.161** 0.379** 1.736** 0.169** 0.388** 1.806** 0.178** 0.395**
(0.471) (0.074) (0.067) (0.362) (0.063) (0.059) (0.365) (0.064) (0.059)
Team Treatment 0.347 0.143** 0.011 0.330 0.137** -0.005 0.288 0.135** -0.014
(0.412) (0.059) (0.067) (0.341) (0.054) (0.061) (0.340) (0.054) (0.061)
Male 0.454* 0.079* 0.099** 0.319 0.056 0.081*
(0.270) (0.044) (0.047) (0.259) (0.044) (0.048)
Age 20 -0.593 -0.108* -0.076 -0.724 -0.121* -0.111
(0.439) (0.058) (0.075) (0.440) (0.062) (0.076)
Age 21 -0.560 -0.078 -0.093 -0.556 -0.077 -0.124
(0.434) (0.055) (0.072) (0.490) (0.069) (0.083)
Age 22 -1.274** -0.235** -0.193** -1.208** -0.210** -0.224**
(0.572) (0.077) (0.091) (0.611) (0.082) (0.097)
Age 23+ -1.580** -0.271** -0.271** -1.704** -0.279** -0.317**
(0.503) (0.074) (0.082) (0.528) (0.083) (0.092)
Pre-period Rec Center visits 0.945** 0.098** 0.092** 0.938** 0.102* 0.091**
(0.097) (0.012) (0.015) (0.097) (0.012) (0.015)
Constant 2.126** 0.517** 0.172** 1.499** 0.477** 0.127* -- -- --
(0.320) (0.054) (0.041) (0.471) (0.067) (0.070)
No Controls With Controls With Controls and Class Fixed Effects
Sample size is 364. Standard errors are clustered at the group level and reported in parentheses. ** (*) indicates statistically significant at the 5 (10) percent level. Columns 4- 6 also include 
indicators for missing age.Table 11. Rec Center Visits for Individual and Team Treatments - Restricted Samples
Visits Try Bonus Visits Try Bonus Visits Try Bonus Sample Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A 364
Any Treatment 1.690** 0.161** 0.379** 1.736** 0.169** 0.388** 1.806** 0.178** 0.395**
(0.471) (0.074) (0.067) (0.362) (0.063) (0.059) (0.365) (0.064) (0.059)
Team Treatment 0.347 0.143** 0.011 0.330 0.137** -0.005 0.288 0.135** -0.014
(0.412) (0.059) (0.067) (0.341) (0.054) (0.061) (0.340) (0.054) (0.061)
Panel B: Sample Restricted to Actives 164
Any Treatment 1.759** 0.023 0.409** 1.682** 0.027 0.418** 1.862** 0.031 0.443**
(0.679) (0.059) (0.106) (0.610) (0.058) (0.100) (0.625) (0.061) (0.099)
Team Treatment -0.883 -0.022 -0.122 -0.489 -0.012 -0.100 -0.634 -0.020 -0.129
(0.539) (0.050) (0.089) (0.480) (0.040) (0.086) (0.502) (0.045) (0.092)
Panel C: Sample Restricted to Inactives 200
Any Treatment 1.782** 0.286** 0.372** 1.829** 0.304** 0.382** 1.811** 0.308** 0.380**
(0.444) (0.091) (0.072) (0.429) (0.089) (0.071) (0.428) (0.090) (0.072)
Team Treatment 1.047** 0.240** 0.088 0.815 0.204** 0.051 0.711 0.188** 0.036
(0.486) (0.086) (0.088) (0.469) (0.086) (0.086) (0.464) (0.084) (0.086)
Panel D: Sample Restricted to Actives 164
Any Treatment 1.759** 0.023 0.409** 1.682** 0.027 0.417** 1.877** 0.030 0.443**
(0.682) (0.059) (0.106) (0.612) (0.058) (0.100) (0.628) (0.061) (0.099)
Team Treatment: Inactive Partner -0.887 -0.033 -0.160 -0.498 -0.025 -0.134 -0.400 -0.029 -0.133
(0.667) (0.063) (0.110) (0.596) (0.058) (0.105) (0.603) (0.061) (0.110)
Team Treatment: Active Partner -0.881 -0.016 -0.099 -0.484 -0.004 -0.077 -0.797 -0.014 -0.127
(0.584) (0.057) (0.102) (0.508) (0.044) (0.098) (0.530) (0.050) (0.106)
Panel E: Sample Restricted to Inactives 200
Any Treatment 1.782** 0.286** 0.372** 1.844** 0.303** 0.387** 1.840** 0.309** 0.390**
(0.445) (0.092) (0.072) (0.429) (0.089) (0.071) (0.427) (0.091) (0.072)
Team Treatment: Inactive Partner 0.818 0.252** 0.002 0.581 0.211** -0.036 0.450 0.183** -0.055
(0.542) (0.094) (0.097) (0.507) (0.093) (0.091) (0.480) (0.089) (0.089)
Team Treatment: Active Partner 1.490** 0.216** 0.255** 1.303** 0.191* 0.232** 1.235* 0.199* 0.217*
(0.612) (0.106) (0.108) (0.625) (0.108) (0.112) (0.651) (0.109) (0.115)
No Controls With Controls With Controls and Class FEs
Sample size is 364. Standard errors are clustered at the group level and reported in parentheses. ** (*) indicates statistically significant at the 5 (10) percent level. Columns 4-9 also 
include indicators for missing age.Table 12. Structural Estimates
95% Percentile 95% Percentile
Coefficient Lower Bound Upper Bound
Panel A - Structural parameters
Male 0.275 1.138 1.138
Age 20 -0.292 -0.796 0.205
Age 21 -0.357 -0.841 0.113
Age 22 -0.613 -1.257 0.002
Age 23+ -0.913 -1.473 -0.389
Pre-period Rec Center Visits 0.293 0.1880 0.417
Predicted partner bonus status 2.168 1.403 2.789
Individual treatment indicator 1.291 0.833 1.722
Constant -1.152 -1.676 -0.613
Theta 0.679 0.269 1.138
Panel B - Theta under different probability of completion assumptions
Theta: certainty -0.043 -0.226 0.198
Theta: unconditional team treatment mean 0.699 0.375 1.127
Theta: unconditional control group mean 4.486 3.440 5.868
1000 bootstrap replications. Sample excludes individuals with missing data for themselves or their partners. The sample size is 362.Table 13. Incidence of Pairs Visiting the Rec Center Together
Number of Same
Time Visits Team Treatment Random Partner Team Treatment Random Partner
0 178 184 178 176
(93.7) (96.8) (93.7) (92.6)
1 10 6 10 14
(5.3) (3.2) (5.3) (7.4)
2 2 0 2 0
(1.1) (0.0) (1.1) (0.0)
Total 190 190 190 190
Same Time = +/- 10 Minutes Same Time = +/- 20 Minutes
Percentage of visits in pairs in parentheses. Random partners are random 'pairs' within class within the team treatment.